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n recent years, economists have rekindled the
debate over whether price stability should be
the sole objective of monetary policy or if output
growth and full employment should be included
as additional objectives. In some theories, elimi-
nating inflation is associated with economic dislo-
cation—rising unemployment and slower economic
growth—and increased economic volatility, at
least temporarily. Those advocating a broad scope
for monetary policy objectives argue that making
price stability the sole objective is a far too one-
sided trade-off. Instead, they contend, the Federal
Reserve also should be concerned with promoting
output growth and smoothing fluctuations in the
economy.
In this vein, critics of recent Federal Reserve
policy contend that monetary policy has been too
restrictive. In a series of Wall Street Journal edi-
torials, Martin Feldstein (1992), Milton Friedman
(1992), and James Buchanan and David Fand
(1992) asserted that slow M2 growth indicates a
Federal Reserve policy that is overly restrictive
and cited the failure of the Federal Reserve to
keep M2 growth within its target growth range in
recent years as evidence of this. Thus, critics
reasoned, the Fed must be responsible (at least
partly) for weak economic growth. Both Friedman
and Buchanan and Fand suggested that letting M2
grow at the midpoint of its target growth range
would be an acceptable strategy. Feldstein urged
an even more aggressive approach: increase M2
growth to make up for past weakness. In each of
these critiques, M2 was the gauge of monetary
policy and, more importantly, was identified as
the appropriate target for the Fed to hit.
Ironically, other critics claim that progress
toward an average inflation rate of zero has been
virtually immeasurable. Price stability proponents
argue that the gradual elimination of inflation
leads to uncertainty, which impedes output growth.
Bennett McCallum (1987, 1988) proposes a rule
that seeks to eliminate inflation quickly and, on
average, would deliver output growth consistent
with full employment. In McCallum’s setup, the
target for monetary policy is nominal gross national
product (GNP). McCallum presents evidence from
in-sample experiments comparing actual nominal
GNP with a simulated GNP generated by his
strategy. McCallum’s results show that simulated
GNP stays fairly close to its desired target path,
and he therefore deems his proposal a successful
strategy for monetary policy.
In this article, we address both sets of critics.
To do so, we examine two alternative monetary
policies and gauge their possible impacts on
economic activity. Our particular focus is how
nominal GNP would have behaved between the
fourth quarter of 1986 and the fourth quarter of
1992, which is the period approximately spanning
the last half of the business-cycle expansion that
ended in 1990 and the early recovery. We de-
scribe simulations of nominal GNP in cases in
which policymakers chose one of the two policies.
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(1986:4–92:4) covers different phases of a busi-
ness cycle and allows us to assess how nominal
GNP might have fared under each monetary
policy, especially by comparing the shape and
duration of the simulated business cycle with
what actually occurred. More importantly, our
results address complaints lodged by both sets of
monetary policy critics. For those who believe
that recent monetary policy has been too restric-
tive, we provide evidence that a policy focused
on maintaining more rapid M2 growth would not
have increased economic growth greatly. For
those who emphasize price stability, our results
provide a glimpse of the path nominal GNP growth
would have experienced had a zero-inflation
policy been implemented cold turkey.
This article presents two main findings. First,
the evidence suggests that the average growth
rate of nominal GNP would have been only one-
quarter to one-half a percentage point higher had
the Federal Reserve implemented a feedback rule
designed to maintain M2 growth.1 In particular,
fluctuations in GNP growth would have had
approximately the same amplitude as what actu-
ally occurred, and the timing of changes in nominal
GNP growth would have been roughly identical
to what actually happened. Second, our findings
indicate that implementing a McCallum-style anti-
inflationary policy (hereafter referred to as the
GNP-targeting rule) would have been successful
in more rapidly slowing nominal GNP growth.
This particular simulation exercise, however,
shows that nominal GNP growth would have
been more volatile compared with what actually
occurred. This extra volatility appears to be the
price paid for the particular set of nonmonetary
shocks that occurred during the simulation period
and follows from the fact that the GNP-targeting
rule only partially accommodates real shocks to
the economy.
Outcomes from two alternative
monetary policies
In this section, we simulate the path that
nominal GNP growth would have followed under
two alternative monetary policies. In particular,
we compare simulated nominal GNP growth with
what actually occurred during the 1986:4–92:4
period. (See the appendix for a detailed descrip-
tion of each monetary policy and how each simu-
lation was implemented.)
A general outline of the two alternative poli-
cies is presented in Figure 1, which shows that
they share many features. The premise in both is
that the policies aim at the same ultimate goals,
measured in terms of output growth and the infla-
tion rate. Moreover, both policies are implemented
through changes in the quantity of monetary base.
The two policies differ, however, in their interme-
diate goals. The GNP-targeting rule, depicted in
the top panel of Figure 1, alters the volume of
monetary base to achieve a targeted value of
nominal GNP growth. The link between the policy
instrument and the intermediate target is base
velocity growth. Under the M2-targeting approach,
depicted in the bottom panel of Figure 1, changes
in the volume of monetary base are aimed at
1 Over the period in question, actual Federal Reserve policy
was formulated partly with an eye toward keeping M2
growth within preannounced target growth ranges, but also
partly with an eye toward real and financial market con-
ditions. Furthermore, policy was implemented primarily
through adjustments in the federal funds rate. In our simu-
lations, consistent with Friedman (1992), we assume that
policy is implemented through adjustments in the monetary
base and that it focuses on keeping M2 growth at the middle
of the target growth range, to the exclusion of all other
considerations.
Figure 1
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achieving the midpoint of the M2 target range.
With an M2 target, the link between policy instru-
ment and intermediate target is the M2 money
multiplier, the ratio of M2 to the monetary base.
Our primary focus in both policy experi-
ments is the behavior of nominal GNP growth.
Consequently, it is necessary to establish the link
between the policy instrument and nominal GNP
growth. We follow McCallum in specifying the
following model describing how nominal GNP
growth is generated:
(1) ∆Yt = a0 + a1 ∆Yt–1 + a2 ∆Bt–1 + et,
where Y is the log of nominal GNP, B is the log
of the monetary base, et represents random
shocks, and ∆ is the difference operator (that is,
∆xt = xt – xt–1). The variables in equation 1 are
interpreted as rates of growth indexed by time.
The error term in this model is an amalgam of
various real shocks, such as aggregate supply
shocks, aggregate demand shocks, money demand
shocks, and so on, that affect the realized value
of nominal GNP growth.
Why focus on nominal GNP growth when
the ultimate goals of policy are in terms of output
growth and the inflation rate? Nominal GNP
growth is the sum of output growth and the infla-
tion rate. Because nominal GNP is a summary
measure of the two ultimate policy goals, a sub-
stantial literature has developed advocating nomi-
nal GNP targeting. By definition, if one knows the
average growth rate of full employment output, a
nominal GNP growth rate target implies an infla-
tion rate target. Or, alternatively, there is a nomi-
nal GNP growth target that corresponds directly to
the natural rate of output growth and the target
inflation rate. Nominal GNP targeting has some
disadvantages relative to monetary targeting, how-
ever, the most obvious of which is the fact that
the monetary aggregates are available in a more
timely manner than are the national income and
product accounts.
Estimation. The data for this study are quarterly
observations of seasonally adjusted nominal GNP
(Y ), the St. Louis definition of the monetary base
adjusted for reserve requirement changes (B), and
seasonally adjusted M2. Equation 1 is estimated
using data for the period 1955:1–92:4. The results
from the nominal GNP growth equation are as
follows (standard errors in parentheses):
(2) ∆Yt = 0.0083 + 0.2864 ∆Yt–1 + 0.3335 ∆Bt–1
 (0.002) (0.084) (0.120)
adj R 2 = 0.17 SEE = 0.010 BG = 1.25.
The estimation results, which are quite close to
those of McCallum (1988), indicate that both lagged
GNP growth and base growth are significantly
related to current GNP growth. (Note, however,
that a substantial fraction of the variation in GNP
growth is left unexplained by this equation.) A
Breusch–Godfrey (BG) test for serial correlation
yields an F-statistic of only 1.25, indicating that
we fail to reject the null hypothesis that no serial
correlation is present in the residuals.
GNP-targeting rule simulations. We use the
GNP-targeting rule along with equation 2 to gen-
erate simulated growth rates for nominal GNP.
Two versions of the GNP-targeting rule are used
to simulate nominal GNP for the 1986–92 period;
one version targets the log level of nominal GNP,
whereas the other version targets the growth rate
of nominal GNP.
In the first simulation, the GNP-targeting rule
presumes that full employment output increases at
a 3-percent annual rate each quarter.2 The target
level of nominal GNP is stipulated to increase at
the same 3-percent annual rate. The GNP-targeting
rule includes a feedback term in which deviations
from target log level of nominal GNP affect the
quantity of base growth. Accordingly, the GNP-
targeting rule dictates that the Federal Reserve
undertake open market operations to alter the
volume of the monetary base. Figure 2 plots
simulated and actual log level nominal GNP, plus
the target path under the GNP-targeting rule. The
simulation results suggest that adopting the GNP-
targeting rule would have been successful in two
respects. One is that such a rule effectively slows
nominal GNP growth. The other is that variation
around the presumed 3-percent target nominal
2 The 3-percent target rate follows the work of McCallum, who
selected this rate because it is close to the historical
average of (trend) output growth.Economic Review — Third Quarter 1994 17
GNP path is reduced.3 The slowing of simulated
nominal GNP growth is not smooth, however. In
particular, simulated nominal GNP falls sharply
relative to actual GNP in the period 1990:2–1991:2.
This sharp deceleration in simulated nominal
spending growth suggests that adoption of McCal-
lum’s GNP-targeting rule would have resulted in
a more severe recession.
In a second simulation experiment, we assume
that past deviations from the level of nominal
GNP are forgiven; that is, the GNP-targeting rule
stipulates that base growth responds (with a lag)
to deviations from the target growth rate of nomi-
nal GNP.4 The objective each period is not a par-
ticular (log) level of nominal GNP but a growth
rate. Figure 3 plots actual and simulated nominal
GNP growth for the case in which the growth-rate
version of the GNP-targeting rule is used to gen-
erate the simulated path. Simulated nominal GNP
grew at an average 2.5-percent annual rate, while
actual GNP increased at an average 5.9-percent
annual rate. As Figure 3 shows, the simulated
growth rate is always below the actual growth
rate of nominal GNP. The plot further suggests
that simulated nominal GNP growth would have
been more volatile than actual nominal GNP
growth. With reference to a 3-percent target
growth rate, the RMSD for simulated nominal GNP
growth is 0.7 percent, compared with 0.6 percent
calculated using actual GNP growth. The implica-
tion, therefore, is that applying the GNP-targeting
rule would have been somewhat less successful
than what actually occurred in terms of average
variation around the 3-percent target growth rate.
The evidence, therefore, suggests that adopting
the growth-rate version of the GNP-targeting rule
would have resulted in slower growth and more
variability around the 3-percent target path than
what the economy actually experienced during
the 1986–92 period.
The increased variability of GNP growth
under the GNP-targeting rule is largely the result
of two factors: a short simulation period and
Figure 2
Nominal GNP Path, 1986:4–92:4,
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3 On average, the GNP-targeting rule produces a nominal
GNP path that increases at a 2.5-percent annual rate during
the period 1986:4–1992:4, compared with actual nominal
GNP, which grew at a 5.9-percent annual rate. Relative to
the target level of GNP, the root-mean-squared deviation
(RMSD) is 0.035 under the GNP-targeting rule but is 0.051
using the actual history of nominal GNP.
4 The term forgiven refers to a policy in which past deviations
from the target level are not relevant for current policy. In
other words, the policymaker is forgiven for these past
misses from the target level.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 18
sizable real shocks hitting the U.S. economy. Note
that the largest difference between what actually
occurred and what the GNP-targeting rule gener-
ates occurs in fourth-quarter 1990. This date corre-
sponds with the run-up in oil prices that occurred
between August and October 1990. During this
period, actual nominal GNP growth did not fall as
sharply as the simulation suggests it would have
under the GNP-targeting rule.
Overall, our simulation results suggest that a
GNP-targeting rule would have slowed nominal
GNP growth compared with what actually occurred.
This finding is not surprising in that many people
would expect slower nominal GNP growth if the
Federal Reserve abruptly switched to a zero-
inflation goal when the environment has a posi-
tive inflation rate. In addition, our results suggest
that compared with what actually occurred, a
GNP-targeting rule would have been moderately
more successful in reducing variation around a
3-percent nominal GNP level target, but some-
what less successful in reducing variation around
a growth-rate target. Under either rule, there is a
deceleration in GNP growth in 1990 that is much
sharper than what actually occurred, suggesting
that these rules, had they been implemented,
could well have resulted in a more severe recession.
M2-targeting approach simulations. Next we
simulate GNP using the M2-targeting approach. In
this setup, we compare nominal GNP growth, M2
growth, and monetary base growth. Our objective
is to gain some insight into whether monetary
policy aimed (exclusively) at hitting the midpoint
of the target M2 growth cones would have been
sufficient to avoid the sharp deceleration of nomi-
nal GNP growth that occurred in 1990 and to
instigate a stronger recovery during the 1991–92
period. This simulation exercise addresses the
criticisms that slow M2 growth was a major factor
in the recent downturn and slow recovery.
The simulations use the fourth-quarter simu-
lated values of M2 to establish the target growth
range for the next year. The Federal Reserve has
the option every fourth quarter to establish its
target growth ranges using either the realized
fourth-quarter value of M2 or the fourth-quarter
target value consistent with the midpoint of the
previous year’s target range. In the former case, in
which the target “drifts,” the Federal Reserve does
not try to make up for missing the previous year’s
M2 target. The latter case expressly requires the
Federal Reserve to stay on a course directly linked
to previous targets. Thus, “no target drift” is ex-
hibited in the latter policy course.5 In the first set of
simulations, we examine the case in which target
drift is allowed to affect the M2 target growth
ranges. Permitting target drift in these simulations
is consistent with the Federal Reserve’s historical
procedure. The target-drift approach also seems
to be in line with Friedman’s and Buchanan and
Fand’s prescription for Federal Reserve policy.6
The target growth ranges and their mid-
points are presented in Table 1. As can be seen,
the midpoints have generally been ratcheted
down over the 1987–92 period, albeit modestly.
This is consistent with the notion that the M2-
targeting approach seeks to gradually lower trend
money growth and, hence, the inflation rate.
Under certain conditions, the longer-run goals of
the M2-targeting approach and the GNP-targeting
rule would exactly coincide. If average M2 velocity
growth is zero, the M2-growth midpoint could be
set equal to 3 percent. Under these velocity
growth assumptions, the M2-targeting rule exam-
ined here presumes that Federal Reserve policy
seeks to slow nominal GNP growth at a less
dramatic pace than the GNP-targeting rule. For
this reason, a direct comparison of simulations
from the M2-targeting approach and GNP-targeting
rule is not made in this article. Given the short
simulation period, the objectives of the two policy
approaches are simply too different, making a
direct comparison virtually meaningless. Instead,
the simulations from the M2-targeting approach
will provide some measure of how successful a
“soft-landing” strategy might have been.
We begin our examination of the M2-target-
ing approach by looking at how nominal GNP
growth would have evolved under this monetary
policy. Figure 4 plots the growth rates of actual
5 In the monetary targeting literature, what we call “target
drift” is sometimes called “base drift.”
6 In this first set of simulations, the forecast for the M2 money
multiplier is simply the previous quarter’s value. The key
assumption is that the money multiplier is not related to the
monetary base. This issue is discussed in the box on page
25 entitled “Caveats to Interpreting the Results.”Economic Review — Third Quarter 1994 19
nominal GNP, together with the growth rate of
nominal GNP generated under the M2-targeting
approach. In contrast to the evidence from the
GNP-targeting rule, simulated nominal GNP
growth using the M2-targeting approach looks
quite similar to actual nominal GNP growth. Simu-
lated nominal GNP growth follows the same cycle
that actual nominal GNP growth followed during
the 1986–92 period, with a somewhat more exag-
gerated downward swing evident in the simula-
tion. The average annual growth rate of simulated
nominal GNP growth is 6.1 percent, only slightly
higher than the 5.9-percent annual rate actually
recorded. From Figure 4, we see that the higher
average growth rate comes primarily from higher
than actual growth in the 1987–89 period. The
plots indicate, however, that after 1990, nominal
GNP growth would have been stronger in 1991:3
and 1992:1, but weaker in 1992:2. Overall, the
simulations indicate three similar features. Nominal
GNP growth would have fallen just as much as
actual nominal GNP growth did in 1990, the average
growth rate of simulated nominal GNP is nearly
identical to what actually occurred in 1991–92,
and the stop-and-go pattern present in actual
nominal GNP growth in 1991–92 is also present
in simulated nominal GNP growth. Hence, there
is little evidence in these simulations to support
the argument that GNP growth would have been
substantially stronger after 1990, the recession and
recovery period, had the Federal Reserve followed
an M2-targeting approach.
Figure 5 plots the actual and simulated path
for M2 growth during the simulation period. From
Figure 5 we see that, with a couple of exceptions,
the M2-targeting approach results in M2 growth
that is roughly similar to what actually occurred.
There is one episode during 1991 in which M2
growth experienced a dramatic swing under the
M2-targeting approach. From Figure 5, one could
infer that the M2-targeting approach may not have
resulted in M2 growth that would have been sub-
stantially different from its actual behavior. Sum-
mary statistics largely support this inference. The
standard deviation is 4 percent under the M2-
targeting approach, while the historical standard
deviation is much lower, 2.3 percent. On average,
M2 would have grown at a 4.4-percent annual
rate if the Federal Reserve had adopted this ver-
sion of the M2-targeting approach, slightly higher
than the 4.1-percent rate actually recorded.
Critics of the Federal Reserve argue that
deficiencies in M2 growth relative to its target
were policy mistakes. One can judge whether a
policy aimed at hitting the midpoint of the target
ranges would have been superior to what actually
occurred by plotting the outcome and the mid-
point target line. This is done in Figure 5a. Note
that the target drift in the simulated path of M2
(measured in log levels) differs from the target
drift actually experienced. Consequently, the plot
uses one target line for the actual path of M2 and
Table 1




1987 8.5 5.5 7.0
1988 8.0 4.0 6.0
1989 7.0 3.0 5.0
1990 7.0 3.0 5.0
1991 6.5 2.5 4.5
1992 6.5 2.5 4.5
Figure 4
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another for the simulated path. All comparisons
are based on the difference between actual or
simulated M2 and the corresponding target value.
The plots do not strongly indicate that one path is
substantially better than the other in terms of
being closer to the target value. The RMSD is 0.95
percent for simulated M2 growth and 0.90 percent
for actual M2 growth. The evidence suggests that
the Federal Reserve would have done slightly
worse in minimizing variation around its M2 target
path had the Fed adopted the M2-targeting ap-
proach.7
In summary, the M2-targeting approach
would have resulted in slightly higher growth
rates for nominal GNP growth and M2 growth.
However, the evidence does not support the
claim that nominal GNP growth would have been
substantially stronger during the 1990–92 period
had the Federal Reserve simply focused exclu-
sively on hitting its M2 target growth rate. In
addition, because of forecasting errors permitted
in this simulation, it is not clear that the Federal
Reserve would have been substantially more
successful in hitting its M2 target growth rates
than it actually was.
Some extensions
We now present some extensions to the
basic simulations considered above. In particular,
we reconsider the GNP-targeting rule when the
target growth path is allowed to more closely
mimic the soft landing sought by the Federal
Reserve. We also consider two extensions to the
M2-targeting approach. First, we consider a case
in which the Federal Reserve eliminates target
drift. This extension is motivated by Feldstein’s
(1992) call for the Fed to “make up” for past
deficiencies in M2 growth. Second, we examine
the case in which the Federal Reserve perfectly
hits its M2 target growth path, thus abstracting
from M2-control problems.
The GNP-targeting rule with a softer landing.
One might view the GNP-targeting rule as being
too harsh, in the sense that the changeover to the
Figure 5a
M2 Path, 1986:4–92:4, Using the M2-Targeting
Approach (Target Lines with Target Drift)
Log level
Figure 5
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7 One potential criticism of the M2-targeting approach as
implemented here is the method used to forecast the M2
money multiplier. Recall, we use last quarter’s actual value
of the M2 money multiplier as the forecast of this quarter’s
value. Since M2t = mm2t + Bt (where mm2 denotes the log
value of the M2 money multiplier), the variability in the M2
money multiplier is solely responsible for our finding that the
M2-targeting approach would have been less accurate in
hitting the M2 target than what actually occurred. We
address forecasting concerns and discuss their impacts
on nominal GNP growth in the next section.
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3-percent nominal GNP growth target is too
abrupt. Suppose the Federal Reserve seeks a
softer landing to its zero-percent inflation goal.
How would the simulations differ if the target
growth rate for nominal GNP were gradually
lowered? This alternative is motivated largely by a
reading of the FOMC minutes during the simula-
tion period: the Federal Reserve was seeking a
gradual approach toward its long-run goals, rather
than the abrupt move toward zero inflation.
We assume that the nominal GNP growth
target is equal to the midpoint of the M2 target
growth range.8 As we did in the GNP-targeting
simulations, we examine cases in which the level
and growth rate of nominal GNP serve as alterna-
tive targets. Figure 6 plots the simulated and
actual values of nominal GNP for the soft-landing
approach to the GNP-targeting rule. The target
level of nominal GNP is included in the plot for
reference. Figure 6 shows that simulated nominal
GNP would have been virtually identical to actual
nominal GNP until 1990. Beginning in 1990, simu-
lated nominal GNP declines sharply toward the
target level until second-quarter 1991, when simu-
lated and actual nominal GNP begin once again to
increase at about the same rate. Under the soft-
landing approach to the GNP-targeting rule, simu-
lated nominal GNP would have increased, on
average, at a 4.8-percent annual rate from 1986
through 1992. (Recall that actual nominal GNP
increased at a 5.9-percent average annual rate.)
The RMSDs are 2.6 percent and 1.5 percent for
simulated and actual nominal GNP, respectively.
Thus, the evidence suggests that actual nominal
GNP was closer to the target path than nominal
GNP would have been under a GNP-targeting rule
aimed at a soft landing.
Figure 7 plots simulated nominal GNP growth
when the target is the soft-landing nominal GNP
growth rate. In addition, actual nominal GNP
growth and the target line are plotted in Figure 7.
Figure 7 reveals that simulated nominal GNP
growth falls more sharply in the third and fourth
Figure 6
Nominal GNP Path, 1986:4–92:4,
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Using the GNP-Targeting Rule with a













8 Simulated paths for monetary base and M2 are available
from the authors upon request. There are any number of
ways to identify the target growth rate for nominal GNP. The
target growth rate is assumed to gradually approach the
long-run rate. This means that the constant term and the
target value in the feedback expression must be changed
from the case in which nominal GNP was assumed to grow
at a 3-percent annual rate each quarter. This identification
is simple to implement. However, it presumes that the
Federal Reserve believed that M2 velocity growth would be
zero over the simulation period.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 22
quarters of 1990 than does actual GNP growth.
The average growth rate of simulated nominal
GNP is 5.3 percent, about one-half a percentage
point below the average growth rate of actual
nominal GNP. The RMSD for simulated nominal
GNP growth is 0.7 percentage points, higher than
the RMSD of 0.5 percentage points using actual
nominal GNP growth. This evidence again sug-
gests that actual nominal GNP growth would have
been closer, on average, to the soft-landing target
than simulated nominal GNP growth would have
been using the GNP-targeting rule.
In short, the extensions result in a much
sharper decline in simulated nominal GNP in 1990
compared with what actually occurred. In addi-
tion, the evidence indicates that the average
deviation from target nominal GNP is smaller if
calculated using actual nominal GNP rather than
simulated GNP. This finding is robust whether
one chooses a level or growth rate target for
nominal GNP. As with the 3-percent version of
the GNP-targeting rule, the evidence suggests that
a much sharper recession would have occurred.
The evidence further indicates that the GNP-
targeting rule with the soft-landing target would
have been less successful in terms of hitting the
targets paths than what actually occurred.
M2 targeting revisited. We now consider two
modifications to the M2-targeting approach devel-
oped above. First, we eliminate drift in the M2
target path. In this case, we assume that the Federal
Reserve uses its fourth-quarter target value as the
starting point for the next year’s target path. The
no-drift approach was suggested by Feldstein in
his prescription for monetary policy.9 By elimi-
nating target drift, past deficiencies in monetary
policy are not forgiven.
Second, we examine the situation in which
the Federal Reserve has perfect foresight with
respect to forecasts of the M2 money multiplier.
This assumption removes the forecast error present
in our earlier simulations. Moreover, it is straight-
forward to show that the perfect-foresight assump-
tion is a strong version of the no-drift case.10
How much does nominal GNP growth
change when the M2-targeting approach is imple-
mented without target drift? Under the no-drift
case with random-walk forecasts of the M2 money
multiplier, the average growth of nominal GNP
over the 1986–92 period is 6.3 percent, with a
standard deviation of 2.7 percent. Simulated
nominal GNP growth is 0.2 percentage points
higher, on average, when drift in the M2 target is
eliminated. Figure 8, which plots actual and simu-
lated nominal GNP growth under the M2-targeting
approach without target drift, shows that the
simulated path is nearly identical to that generated
with target drift. In particular, the slowdown in
1990 and the moderate, uneven growth during
1991–92 is present even when target drift is elimi-
nated. One subtle difference occurs in second-
quarter 1991. With target drift present, nominal
GNP growth would have been substantially below
what actually occurred (see Figure 4). In Figure 8,
however, simulated nominal GNP growth in
second-quarter 1991 would have been almost
9 The issue of target drift versus no target drift has a long
history in the debate over monetary policy.
10 Under the perfect-foresight assumption, target drift is
implicitly eliminated. Because the Federal Reserve hits its
target every fourth quarter under perfect foresight, the
starting point for next year’s target path is, by construction,
the fourth-quarter target value. Thus, the perfect-foresight
case is identical to jointly assuming no drift and no fore-
cast error.
Figure 8
Nominal GNP Growth Rate Path, 1986:4–92:4,













’92:4 ’91:4 ’90:4 ’89:4 ’88:4 ’87:4 ’86:4
Actual
SimulatedEconomic Review — Third Quarter 1994 23
equal to what actually occurred. Thus, the evi-
dence shows that eliminating target drift does
generate somewhat stronger nominal GNP growth
after 1990 than is generated when target drift is
present. Any substantive gain, however, appears
limited to second-quarter 1991.
Figure 9 plots the log level of M2 under the
M2-targeting approach with target drift eliminated,
along with the target path and actual M2. The
vertical distance between the target line and the
outcome from the M2-targeting approach in Figure
9 is due solely to forecast error of the M2 money
multiplier. Figure 9 shows that the M2-targeting
approach yields an M2 path consistently below
the target path since 1990. The implication is that
the random-walk forecasts of the M2 money
multiplier consistently overpredict the multiplier
value.11
In almost every quarter, simulated M2 is
closer to the target value than actual M2. Despite
the run of underpredicting the M2 money multi-
plier, simulated M2 would have been closer, on
average, to a no-drift target than what actually
occurred. To get an idea of the extent of the
difference between the no-drift target value and
the actual quantity of M2, by fourth-quarter 1992,
M2 was $3,495.4 billion, whereas the no-drift
target value would have been $3,789.9 billion.
Hence, the actual value of M2 was roughly $294.5
billion, or 8.4 percent, below what the target
would have been in the absence of target drift.12
Finally, how would nominal GNP have grown
if one could perfectly forecast the M2 money
multiplier? Here we use the actual value of the M2
money multiplier, implicitly assuming that this
path is independent of the path for monetary base.
Under the M2-targeting approach with perfect
foresight, the average growth rate of nominal GNP
is 6.5 percent, 0.6 percentage points higher than
what actually occurred. Figure 10 plots nominal
GNP growth generated under the perfect-foresight
assumption, along with actual nominal GNP
growth. In general, the path of simulated nominal
GNP growth is roughly the same as what actually
occurred. Even under the perfect-foresight assump-
tion, simulated nominal GNP growth has the
erratic stop-and-go pattern that characterizes actual
GNP growth. In sum, nominal GNP growth with
the perfect-foresight assumption does only mod-
estly better than what actually occurred. Contra-
dicting the critics, the evidence provided here
does not support the notion that the M2-targeting
approach would have resulted in a smaller decline
in nominal GNP in 1990 than what actually occurred
or that simulated nominal GNP growth would
have experienced a smoother, stronger recovery
compared with what actually occurred.
11 In a related article, John Duca (1993) suggests that stan-
dard M2 money demand functions systematically over-
predicted M2 during the 1990–92 period. One interpreta-
tion is that some real shock was influencing M2. In our setup,
such a shock would be picked up as changes in the M2
money multiplier.
12 The astute reader may wonder why the sizable difference
between actual and simulated M2 does not translate into a
greater distinction between actual and simulated nominal
GNP growth in Figure 8. The relationship between M2
growth and nominal GNP growth is M2 velocity growth. Note
that M2 velocity growth is the difference between monetary
base velocity growth and M2 money multiplier growth. With
monetary base growth present explicitly in the nominal GNP
growth equation, deviations from trend in monetary base
velocity growth are present in the simulation. To the extent
that deviations from trend in both M2 velocity growth and M2
money multiplier growth are negatively correlated, move-
ments in M2 growth may not translate into movements in
nominal GNP growth.
Figure 9
M2 Path, 1986:4–92:4, Using the M2-Targeting
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Summary and conclusions
We present simulations in this article that
correspond to two alternative monetary policies
proposed by critics of the Federal Reserve. We
focus on how nominal GNP under each of these
two policies would have behaved compared with
what actually occurred. As such, the simulated
paths for nominal GNP provide us with a measure
of the costs and benefits of each strategy com-
pared with what the U.S. economy actually experi-
enced during the 1986–92 period.
We offer two main conclusions. First, our
results suggest that a GNP-targeting rule of the
type advocated by Bennett McCallum would have
been effective in slowing nominal GNP growth
relative to what was experienced between 1986
and 1992. The evidence also suggests, however,
that such a GNP-targeting rule would have been
less successful in terms of minimizing variability
around the target value of nominal GNP. Indeed,
except for the case in which the Federal Reserve
targets the level of nominal GNP increasing at a
fixed 3-percent annual rate, deviations from the
target path are smaller for actual nominal GNP
than what would have been generated under the
GNP-targeting rule. The apparent cause behind
nominal GNP’s bumpy path is a series of real
shocks influencing the economy. We interpret
these findings as a first-pass attempt to measure
the economic costs, in terms of business-cycle
fluctuations, that a policymaker faces by adopting
the GNP-targeting rule. The benefit of the rule is
that the economy more quickly achieves its long-
run goal of zero inflation. The costs, at least over
the 1986–92 period, include slower growth and
moderately greater volatility around nominal GNP
target values and, possibly, a much steeper reces-
sion than that which actually occurred.
Our second conclusion is that using a mon-
etary policy in which the Federal Reserve seeks
only to hit the midpoint of its annual M2 target
ranges, nominal GNP growth would have been
roughly the same as that which actually occurred.
Our simulations reveal that the average growth
rate of GNP would have been only between 0.1
and 0.6 percentage points higher (depending on
the assumptions underlying the simulations) than
what actually occurred. Critics of recent monetary
policy fault the Federal Reserve’s failure to achieve
its M2 targets for the evolution of economic activity
in the 1991–92 period. Our results show that
hitting the midpoints of the M2 target might well
have not materially altered either the reduction in
nominal GNP in 1990 or the moderate, stop-and-
go pattern of nominal GNP growth experienced in
1991–92. Indeed, this outcome suggests that the
culprit was not Fed actions, but real shocks affect-
ing nominal GNP growth that the M2-targeting
approach would largely have been unable to
offset. In this sense, our simulations suggest that
the slow growth of M2 is not the sole reason for
the slow nominal GNP growth since 1986.
Our results explore issues raised by critics of
Federal Reserve policy. Those who advocate a
policy more oriented toward achieving zero infla-
tion get a glimpse of what the implied costs are—
slower nominal GNP growth but also greater
volatility in nominal GNP growth for periods as
long as twenty-five quarters. For those who want
more robust monetary growth, specifically aimed
at hitting the M2 target midpoints, the results
show that very little would have been achieved in
terms of promoting faster nominal GNP growth. A
question for future research is whether this episode
represents the typical monetary policy contribu-
tion to nominal GNP growth or whether the
1986–92 period was an aberrant one in some sense.
Figure 10
Nominal GNP Growth Rate Path, 1986:4–92:4,
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For the purposes of our research, we assume that the
Federal Reserve uses the monetary base as the instru-
ment of monetary policy beginning in the fourth quarter of
1986. Indeed, the equations in this article treat history as
if the monetary base were the exogenous policy variable
in determining nominal GNP growth between 1954 and
1992. Policy history, however, suggests that the Federal
Reserve did not use the monetary base as its primary
instrument during the postwar period. While the simula-
tions follow the methodological approach adopted by
McCallum (1987, 1988), important caveats could affect
the results presented in this article.
The Lucas critique
In his criticism of econometric policy evaluation, Rob-
ert Lucas (1972) demonstrated how changing monetary
policy rules would probably change the parameter esti-
mates in reduced-form equations. The Lucas critique
applies to both our nominal GNP growth equation and,
implicitly, to our M2 money multiplier forecasts.
We assume that equation 2 is not affected when
monetary policy switches from its (average) postwar
behavior to the base rule or the M2-targeting approach.
The fact that the equation is statistically stable over the
1986–92 period is not sufficient to rule out the possibility
that the parameter estimates in equation 2 would change
due to a change in the policy rule. The Lucas critique
casts doubt over the simulated paths for nominal GNP
growth. In partial defense of our approach, it should be
noted that McCallum estimates several atheoretical mod-
els and some structural models to consider the robust-
Caveats to Interpreting the Results
ness of the rule. Overall, the outcome of the rules-based
policy is consistent across a variety of models. He (appro-
priately) recognizes the parameter estimates would not
be the same under alternative policy rules but that such
simulations provide a useful starting point.
The money multiplier forecasting equation
We assume that the path of the money multiplier is
independent of the monetary base. Not only do we
assume that changes in monetary policy do not affect the
reduced-form model of the M2 money multiplier, we
further assume that movements in the monetary base do
not affect the multiplier. Work by Daniel Thornton and
Michele Garfinkel (1991) suggests that the money multi-
plier may be sensitive to changes in the monetary base.
If true, our simulations may have been affected by changes
in the monetary base. Even so, our conclusions would be
changed only if the M2 money multiplier would have been
much lower as a result of adopting these policies. Under
the M2-targeting approach, monetary base would grow at
a faster rate to offset the decline in the money multiplier.
Accordingly, the faster monetary base growth in equation
2 implies that nominal GNP growth would be higher.
Interestingly, Thornton and Garfinkel’s results suggest a
positive association between changes in the monetary
base and changes in the M2 money multiplier. Since the
M2-targeting approach results in faster monetary base
growth in our simulations, Thornton and Garfinkel’s re-
sults suggest that the speedup in base growth would be
moderated by faster growth in the M2 money multiplier.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 26
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In this appendix, we describe the two alternative
monetary policies examined in this article. In particular,
the approaches used to simulate the GNP-targeting rule
and the M2-targeting approach are discussed in detail.
The GNP-targeting rule
The GNP-targeting rule used in our simulations is
similar to the one proposed by Bennett McCallum (1987,
1988). The GNP-targeting rule is written as
(A.1) ∆Bt = 0.00739 – 1/16 [(Yt –1 – Yt –17)
– (Bt–1 – Bt –17)] + λ(Y *
t –1 – Yt–1),
where ∆B is the growth rate of the monetary base (B is
the log of the monetary base), Y is the log of nominal
GNP, Y * is the target value for (the log of) GNP, and
λ (0 ≤ λ ≤ 1) is a parameter relating the current period’s
base growth to past deviations from the target growth rate
of nominal GNP. Following McCallum, we assume that
potential output increases at a constant 3-percent annual
rate, or roughly the historical trend rate of real GNP
growth. In a noninflationary environment, Y * increases at
the same 3-percent annual rate.
Equation A.1 has three components. The constant
term—0.00739—stipulates that the base should in-
crease at a quarterly value equal to a 3-percent annual
rate. The second component is that base growth re-
sponds to changes in velocity growth. This aspect of the
GNP-targeting rule has also been advocated by Allan
Meltzer (1984). More specifically, each percentage point
increase in the sixteen-quarter moving average of veloc-
ity growth, for example, is matched by a percentage point
decrease in base growth. Lastly, the base responds to
differences between realized nominal GNP and its target.
In other words, there is a λ-percentage point increase in
base growth for each percentage point that nominal GNP
is below the previous quarter’s target of GNP, all else
being equal. In our simulations, the nominal GNP target
is defined in both levels and growth rates. In the growth
rate version, ∆Y * t –1 – ∆Yt –1 replaces the terms inside
the parentheses in the feedback component.
The GNP-targeting rule with a growth rate target
differs from McCallum, who specifies that deviations
from last quarter’s target level affects the current quar-
ter’s base growth. By specifying a GNP-targeting rule in
which base growth responds to deviations from nominal
GNP’s target growth rate, an economy in which the
Appendix
average rate of inflation is zero is the appropriate notion
of price stability for monetary policy’s goal. In McCal-
lum’s level specification of the GNP-targeting rule, a
stronger version—a constant long-run price level—is
the price-stability notion adopted.
With equation A.1, one more equation is needed to
implement the GNP-targeting rule; that is, the (stochas-
tic) law of motion for nominal GNP. We assume that
movements in nominal GNP are driven by equation 2 in
the text.
The M2-targeting procedure. Following Friedman’s
(1992) suggestion, the monetary base is used as the
instrument to hit the midpoint of the Federal Reserve’s
stated target ranges for the M2 aggregate. The M2
targeting approach is implemented by using a link be-
tween monetary base and M2. In the simple money
multiplier model (Brunner 1968), M2 is represented as
(A.2) M2t = Bt + mm2t,
where M2 is the log of the M2 aggregate, B is the log of
the monetary base, and mm2 is the log of the M2 money
multiplier (M2/B). Equation A.2 indicates that a desired
M2 level objective can be achieved by simply supplying
the quantity of monetary base consistent with the M2
target, given the M2 money multiplier. In practice, how-
ever, the Federal Reserve may miss the M2 target value
because the value of the money multiplier is not known
with certainty at the time it determines the quantity of
monetary base.
The M2 target value and the practical aspect of fore-
casting the money multiplier suggests rewriting equation
A.2 as




t is the target (log) level for M2 this quarter,
and mm2f
t  is a forecast of this quarter’s money multi-
plier. How closely the policymaker hits the M2 target
depends in large part on how accurately the multiplier
can be predicted.
To implement the M2-targeting policy, it is necessary
to identify two values: the M2 target value and the
forecast of the M2 money multiplier. The target value of
M2 is derived using the midpoint of the Federal Reserve’s
announced target range. The starting point is the value of
(Continued on the next page)Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 28
Appendix—Continued
M2 in the fourth quarter of 1986. Because the target
range is updated each year in the fourth quarter, there
also arises an issue regarding the treatment of starting
points in the fourth quarter of each successive year. Two
approaches specify the first-quarter target value of M2
for each year. These two approaches are characterized
as follows:
(A.3) M2T




t –1 + gt,
where g is the quarterly value of the midpoint of the target
growth range. Equation A.3 specifies that the first-quarter
target uses the actual value of M2 in the fourth quarter of
the previous year. Since actual M2 can differ from its
target value, A.3 permits deviations from fourth-quarter
target to persist, thus introducing target drift into the
policy. In contrast, equation A.4 specifies the first-quarter
target value of M2 using the target value from the pre-
ceding fourth quarter. This approach requires that devia-
tions from the target path are not permanent. Because
fourth-quarter deviations from the target value are not
passed on to the first-quarter target in A.4, this latter
specification is referred to as the no target drift case. Both
A.3 and A.4 are used in this article to identify the target
path for M2 in the simulations.
Once the path for M2 is identified, the money multi-
plier is left to forecast. In general, the path for the money
multiplier can be described by the equation
(A.5) mm2t = A(L)Xt –1 + t,
where X is a 1 × K vector of exogenous (including pre-
determined) variables, A(L) is the qth degree matrix
polynomial in the lag operator L, and  is a random-error
term with mean zero and finite variance, σ. Suppose the
conditions are satisfied such that optimal multiplier fore-
cast is given as
(A.5′) mm2f
t  = A(L)Xt –1.
We use two alternative methods to forecast the money
multiplier. First, we assume that the M2 money multiplier
follows a random walk.1 Second, we consider a perfect-
foresight model where mm2f
t  = mm2t.
After identifying the path for the M2 target and obtain-
ing the M2 money multiplier forecast, the path for mone-
tary base is constructed using equation A.2′. Assuming
equation 2 is the data-generating function for nominal
GNP growth, the values of base money generated by
both the base rule and M2-targeting approach are used
to simulate a path for nominal GNP.
The path for nominal GNP growth also includes
a nonmonetary-policy shock term. To measure the
nonmonetary-policy shock, we estimate the nominal
GNP growth equation (equation 1) over the period
1954:2–92:4, interpreting the residuals from this regres-
sion as the nonmonetary-policy shocks. The nonmone-
tary-policy shocks are denoted et. Let ∆Yt = 0.0083 +
0.2864 ∆Yt –1 + 0.3335 ∆Bt –1 be the value of nominal
GNP growth consistent with the path for monetary base
growth generated by the monetary policy. For the period
1986:4–92:4, the simulated value of nominal GNP growth
is ∆Yt
s = ∆Yt + et. By the properties of regression analysis,
the nonmonetary-policy shock is orthogonal to move-
ments in the monetary base. The idea here is to measure
those parts of nominal GNP growth that are not explained
by movements in monetary base.
1 We also used Box–Jenkins methods to forecast the M2 money
multiplier, following work by Bomhoff (1977), Hafer and Hein
(1984), and Johannes and Rasche (1987). The simulations
with the time-series approach are negligibly different from those
reported here.